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SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE
The impact of such a decision is great. The very purpose of label-
ing an investigation non-public is undercut.28 If the agency must release
transcripts to witnesses and witnesses have no privilege of secrecy once
the transcript is in their hands, then the agency's privilege of confiden-
tiality will, in effect, be greatly decreased. The court has thus inter-
preted the federal statute on transcript disclosure to effectuate a signifi-
cant piercing of the agency's veil of secrecy.
ANTiBIoTIcS CERTIFICATION - EVIDENTIARY HEARING
The right of an aggrieved party to an evidentiary hearing of an ad-
ministrative action is not an absolute one.29 It has often been held that
where a hearing is not a matter of right by statute,30 the party must
establish some valid basis for its request.31 The Second Circuit Court of
situation because the effectiveness of the Census Bureau was dependent upon a guarantee
of confidentiality, whereas in the SEC investigation a person is under a subpoena to testify
and thus is testifying not as a result of a promise of confidentiality but on penalty of
contempt.
28 Nonpublic investigations have traditionally retained their aura of inaccessibility
due to the realization that they
might be thwarted in certain cases if not kept secret, and that if witnesses were
given a copy of their transcript, suspected violators would be in a better position
to tailor their own testimony to that of the previous testimony, and to threaten
witnesses about to testify with economic or other reprisals.
438 F.2d at 451, quoting Commercial Capital Corp. v. SEC, 360 F.2d 856, 858 (7th Cir. 1966).
29 The courts have differed on the question of whether an individual affected by ad-
ministrative action is entitled to a hearing. Some courts have warned against agency action
without an evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Gas &- Water Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 427 F.2d 568 (D.C. Cir. 1970), where the court stated that an agency should
exercise restraint against the temptation to take action without notice and a hearing.
In the same vein, courts have discussed the question of a hearing by stating, "[Tihe need
for administrative flexibility does not of itself preclude an agency hearing or judicial
review." Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 1.2d 1243, 1246 (1st Cir. 1970). Other courts, however, have
reiterated the traditional maxim that "[A] hearing is not constitutionally compelled in
all cases where individual rights may be impaired." See Drown v. Portsmouth School
Dist., 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970).
30 A hearing before an agency is a right when required by statute or when the agency's
action may deprive an individual of due process. Where there is no mandatory statutory
requirement of a hearing, the courts will evaluate such factors as: the nature of the interest
effected, the availability of judicial review, and the immediacy of the case. See Cafeteria
& Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). See Note, Summary Removal
of Drugs from the Market: The Specter of the Heavy Bureaucratic Hand, 24 Sw. L.J. 880,
881 n.ll (1970).
31 In discussing the question of an evidentiary hearing, the courts generally make a
distinction between whether the agency's action had involved adjudication or rule-making.
As a general rule, the agencies are not permitted to act adjudicatively without a hearing,
whereas in rule-making, a hearing is not required. Adjudicative facts are those which
concern the parties involved, i.e., they answer the question of "who did what, where, when,
how, why and with what motive or intent." Rule-making (or legislative) facts do no con-
cern the immediate parties, but are general facts which are used to assist in establishing
policy and discretion. These distinctions, however, are often unsatisfactory in various re-
spects, as shall be seen in the instant case. 1 K. DAvis, ADMiNIsrRATrvE LAw TREATISE 412-
13 (1958).
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Appeals in Pfizer, Inc. v. Richardson,32 has reiterated this precept and
expanded its applicability to the area of revocation of antibiotic cer-
tifications by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). In this case,
the court held that it was not a deprivation of due process to require
the manufacturer affected to state reasonable grounds for the holding
of an evidentiary hearing by the agency when the manufacturer's anti-
biotics were about to lose their certification by the FDA.
The crux of Pfizer's argument was that since the particular anti-
biotics3 3 (the so-called "old drugs") had been certified under an earlier
statute34 which had required only that the drug be safe, it was an in-
fringement on the corporation's right to due process to repeal the
regulations which had certified the drugs on the grounds of failure to
show safety and effectiveness without an opportunity to hold an eviden-
tiary hearing.3 5
Pfizer claimed that it had met the "substantial evidence" 30 require-
32 434 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1970).
33 The antibiotics involved were two Signemycin products which had been certified by
the agency in the 1950's.
34 The drugs had originally been certified under section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug
& Cosmetic Act of 1938, (21 U.S.C. § 355 (1970)) which prohibited tile introduction into
interstate commerce of any drug unless it had been certified as safe. Under section 505,
the drug's certification could be withdrawn upon a finding by the Secretary of Agriculture
that the tests available to him did not demonstrate "whether or not such drug is safe for
use under the conditions prescribed .. " 21 U.S.C. § 855(d) (1970).
Section 505 was amended by Congress in 1962 to require that the manufacturer show
both that the drug was safe and that it has "the effect it purports or is represented to
have under the conditions of use prescribed . . ." in order to be approved by the Secretary
of Health, Education and Welfare. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1970). However, the withdrawal of
approval by the Secretary could be effected under the new statute only "after due notice
and opportunity for hearing to the applicant." 21 U.S.C. § 855(e) (1970).
35 At the same time as Congress amended section 505, it also amended section 507
(21 U.S.C. § 357 (1970)) which was now to include antibiotic drugs formerly certified under
section 505 for safety alone. The Pfizer drug fell into this category. The drugs were to be
certified
if such drug has such characteristics of identity and such batch has such charac-
teristics of strength, quality & purity, as the Secretary prescribes in such regula-
tions as necessary to adequately insure safety and efficacy of use ....
21 U.S.C. § 357(a) (1970).
To review these drugs for effectiveness which had only been certified as safe, the FDA
enlisted the aid of the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council (NAS-
NRC). The council made recommendations on those drugs it found to fail the efficacy test.
Under section 507(f), the Secretary would then give notice to the corporation involved to
present its views on the proposed revocation of certification of the drug. The new statute
provided for a specific procedure:
At any time prior to the thirtieth day after such action is made public, any in-
terested person may file objections to such action, specifying with particularity
the changes desired, stating reasonable grounds therefor, and requesting a public
hearing upon such objections . . ..
21 U.S.C. § 357(f) (1970) (emphasis added).
The right to a public hearing which had been mandatory under section 505 was now
conditional upon the manufacturer's showing of "reasonable grounds therefor."
S6 The regulations established the criteria for "substantial evidence" as being "derived
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ment of effectiveness by presenting clinical data which proved that the
drug was effective as prescribed. The FDA held that the evidence
presented had not been substantial and that Pfizer had not stated rea-
sonable grounds3 7 for objections to the agency finding. The corporation
was thus precluded from an evidentiary hearing and the agency sub-
sequently repealed the regulations upon which the certification had
been based.
The court in Pfizer refused to make a determination as to whether
this was a case of adjudication or rule-making.38 It was concerned in-
stead with the fact that Congress had expressly established the showing
of reasonable grounds as a condition precedent for holding an eviden-
tiary hearing by the agency.39 Had it intended to maintain the manda-
tory hearing requirement prior to revocation of a drug's certification,
the court felt that Congress would have done so. The court further
stated that there was no reason to place the pre-1962 "old drugs" on a
from adequate and well-controlled clinical investigations in support of promotional claims."
434 F.2d at 541. These regulations and the criteria contained therein had been upheld in
Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Richardson, 318 F. Supp. 301 (D. Del. 1970). That case,
however, did not pertain to the "old drugs" which had been certified under section 505,
as exemplified by those in Pfizer.
37 The repealing of certification for certain combination drugs without an evidentiary
hearing had been upheld in Upjohn Co. v. Finch, 422 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1970), which
directly preceded Pfizer. In that case, the court held that the manufacturer had failed to
present "substantial evidence" of the drug's efficacy and that the FDA had properly re-
voked the certification without a hearing when "reasonable grounds therefor" had not been
established by the manufacturer. Since the Upjohn drugs had been certified in 1956, they
fell into the "old drugs" classification.
The FDA had decided to give the manufacturers notice of proposed rule-making and
an opportunity for comment as a result of an earlier case, Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v.
Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1970), which held that it was error not to give an ade-
quate opportunity for comment.
38 In the Upjohn case, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had similarly refused to
make such a distinction. Upjohn had contended this was an adjudicatory case and thus
they were entitled to a hearing. See Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, 175 F.2d 808, 816 (D.C. Cir.
1948), vacated as moot, 337 U.S. 901 (1949), which stated,
It is elementary that the action of an administrative tribunal is adjudicatory in
character if it is particular and immediate, rather than, as in the case of legisla-
tive or rulemaking action, general and future in effect.
On the other hand, the FDA had contended that the case involved rule-making and
thus requires no evidentiary hearing, citing Federal Power Comm'n. v. Texaco, 377 U.S.
33 (1964), which held that the agency's promulgation of regulations establishing a pricing
provision in utility contracts was permissible without a hearing.
The Upjohn court refused to make such a distinction. It merely stated that the history
of the interpretations of the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act did not require an evidentiary
hearing as a right.
39 In discussing the Congressional intent, the court stated:
When it [Congress] brought antibiotics under a separate section of the statute in
1945, it chose not to copy the "after due notice and opportunity for hearing to the
applicant" language of § 505(e).... but to demand as a prerequisite to a hearing
that those filing objections to the Secretary's action state "reasonable grounds
therefor."
434 F.2d at 542.
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separate status than the post-1962 drugs. What was permissible for the
one should also be permissible for the other, in spite of the fact that
the "old drugs" had been certified on lesser criteria than the post-1962
drugs.40
Although earlier Second Circuit cases have held that there is no
absolute right to an evidentiary hearing by an aggrieved party,41 and
that the agency may require the party to establish a reason for holding
such a hearing,42 the Pfizer case is the first one in this circuit dealing
with the hearing requirement in revocation of drug certifications. The
court is generally following the trend of other circuits in the drug cer-
tification cases. However, the practical impact of such a holding is quite
significant. If the Pfizer holding is upheld in future cases, it seems clear
that the FDA will be able to decide that a drug is ineffective and to
repeal its certification without granting a single hearing. Through its
requirement of a showing of "reasonable grounds" for the granting of a
hearing, the FDA has been permitted to apply to all antibiotics, both
"old" and "new," a standard which, for all practical purposes, can be
met only if the agency says it has been met.43
40 On the subject of requirements of the two drug groups, the court noted:
e would hardly be justified in finding, on so scant a basis, a Congressional man-
requiring the FDA to employ a double standard of efficacy in evaluating
antibiotics, all of which were now subject to § 507.
Id. at 545.
41 See NLRB v. Joclin Mfg. Co., 314 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1963) wherein the court stated,
Recognizing the need for expedition in certification matters justifies the Board in
imposing reasonable conditions to the allowance of a hearing on objections
Id. at 633 [footnotes omitted].
42 "When a hearing before an administrative agency is not a matter of right, a party
seeking such a hearing must establish some valid basis for its request." See Note, Summary
Removal of Drugs from the Market: The Specter of the Heavy Bureaucratic Hand, 24
Sw. L.J. 880, 881-82 (1970).
43 For a discussion of the impact of Upjohn, Pfizer and similar holdings, see Phelps,
After Panalba, Whither, 26 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 186 (1971).
